From Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief

From Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief

$20.00 AUD

Availability: in stock at our Tullamarine warehouse

Condition: SECONDHAND

This is a secondhand book. The jacket image is a photograph of the exact copy we have in stock. This image shows the condition of this book. Further condition remarks are below.

Author: Stephen Stich
Binding: Paperback
Published: MIT Press, 1983

Condition:
Book: Fair
Jacket: No dust jacket
Pages: Good
Markings: No markings
Condition remarks: Condition as shown in image. Creased and worn cover.

From Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief presents a rigorous philosophical argument challenging the traditional understanding of belief within the realm of cognitive science. Stephen Stich meticulously examines the foundations of folk psychology, illustrating its limitations when confronted with contemporary scientific models of the mind. This influential work argues for a re-evaluation of our conceptual framework, proposing a compelling case against the explanatory power of belief in scientific psychology. The text details complex theoretical positions with clarity, offering a profound contribution to ongoing debates in philosophy and cognitive theory.

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Description

Author: Stephen Stich
Binding: Paperback
Published: MIT Press, 1983

Condition:
Book: Fair
Jacket: No dust jacket
Pages: Good
Markings: No markings
Condition remarks: Condition as shown in image. Creased and worn cover.

From Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief presents a rigorous philosophical argument challenging the traditional understanding of belief within the realm of cognitive science. Stephen Stich meticulously examines the foundations of folk psychology, illustrating its limitations when confronted with contemporary scientific models of the mind. This influential work argues for a re-evaluation of our conceptual framework, proposing a compelling case against the explanatory power of belief in scientific psychology. The text details complex theoretical positions with clarity, offering a profound contribution to ongoing debates in philosophy and cognitive theory.