The Concept Of Law
Condition: SECONDHAND
This is a secondhand book. The jacket image is a photograph of the exact copy we have in stock. This image shows the condition of this book. Further condition remarks are below.
Condition remarks:
Book: Good
Jacket: Worn/faded, no tears
Pages: Good , price clipped
Markings: Previous owner
A landmark work in legal philosophy and jurisprudence, The Concept of Law presents one of the twentieth century's most rigorous and influential analyses of the nature of law, legal systems, and their relationship to morality. H.L.A. Hart argues against the simplistic command theory of law advanced by John Austin, proposing instead a sophisticated framework built on the distinction between primary rules—which impose obligations—and secondary rules, which govern how those primary rules are created, modified, and adjudicated. Written with rare clarity and analytical precision, the text illustrates how legal systems derive their authority not merely from coercion, but from a shared social practice of rule-following grounded in what Hart calls the rule of recognition. The work also engages directly with the natural law tradition, carefully examining the minimum content of natural law and the contested boundary between legal and moral obligation. Essential reading for students of law, philosophy, and political theory, it remains the definitive starting point for any serious engagement with the question of what law actually is.
Author: H.L.A. Hart
Format: Hardback
Published: 1970, Oxford at the Clarendon Press
Genre: Philosophy
Condition remarks:
Book: Good
Jacket: Worn/faded, no tears
Pages: Good , price clipped
Markings: Previous owner
A landmark work in legal philosophy and jurisprudence, The Concept of Law presents one of the twentieth century's most rigorous and influential analyses of the nature of law, legal systems, and their relationship to morality. H.L.A. Hart argues against the simplistic command theory of law advanced by John Austin, proposing instead a sophisticated framework built on the distinction between primary rules—which impose obligations—and secondary rules, which govern how those primary rules are created, modified, and adjudicated. Written with rare clarity and analytical precision, the text illustrates how legal systems derive their authority not merely from coercion, but from a shared social practice of rule-following grounded in what Hart calls the rule of recognition. The work also engages directly with the natural law tradition, carefully examining the minimum content of natural law and the contested boundary between legal and moral obligation. Essential reading for students of law, philosophy, and political theory, it remains the definitive starting point for any serious engagement with the question of what law actually is.