On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence
Condition: SECONDHAND
This is a secondhand book. The jacket image is a photograph of the exact copy we have in stock. This image shows the condition of this book. Further condition remarks are below.
Condition remarks:
Book: Good
Jacket: Worn/faded, no tears
Pages: Good
Why do brilliant military strategists so often snatch defeat from the jaws of victory? On the Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman F. Dixon presents a forensic and deeply unsettling answer, dissecting some of history's most catastrophic military failures — from the Charge of the Light Brigade to the fall of Singapore — to reveal the psychological forces that drive commanders to make disastrously poor decisions. Dixon, a former Royal Engineer and professor of psychology, argues with rigorous authority that military incompetence is not a matter of chance or individual stupidity, but rather the predictable product of institutional cultures that select for authoritarian personalities, suppress dissent, and reward conformity over critical thinking. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, cognitive psychology, and a wealth of historical case studies, Dixon constructs a devastating portrait of how organisations can systematically breed the very failures they seek to avoid. His analysis illuminates the dangerous relationship between rigid hierarchy, masculine ego, and catastrophic misjudgement — themes that resonate far beyond the battlefield. At once a gripping work of military history and a profound psychological study, this landmark text leaves the reader with one haunting question: how many of our modern institutions are making the same fatal mistakes?
Author: Norman F. Dixon
Format: Hardback
Genre: Psychology
Condition remarks:
Book: Good
Jacket: Worn/faded, no tears
Pages: Good
Why do brilliant military strategists so often snatch defeat from the jaws of victory? On the Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman F. Dixon presents a forensic and deeply unsettling answer, dissecting some of history's most catastrophic military failures — from the Charge of the Light Brigade to the fall of Singapore — to reveal the psychological forces that drive commanders to make disastrously poor decisions. Dixon, a former Royal Engineer and professor of psychology, argues with rigorous authority that military incompetence is not a matter of chance or individual stupidity, but rather the predictable product of institutional cultures that select for authoritarian personalities, suppress dissent, and reward conformity over critical thinking. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, cognitive psychology, and a wealth of historical case studies, Dixon constructs a devastating portrait of how organisations can systematically breed the very failures they seek to avoid. His analysis illuminates the dangerous relationship between rigid hierarchy, masculine ego, and catastrophic misjudgement — themes that resonate far beyond the battlefield. At once a gripping work of military history and a profound psychological study, this landmark text leaves the reader with one haunting question: how many of our modern institutions are making the same fatal mistakes?